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Patent portfolio diversity and firm profitability: 
A question of specialization or diversification?   
  
Abstract 
The relationship between patent portfolio diversity and firm profitability is conceptually opaque 
and empirically equivocal. We contribute to the literature with a systematic analysis of this 
relationship by carrying out an empirical investigation based on a sample of 391 international firms. 
We generate data for patent portfolio diversity at the level of sections, classes, and sub-classes of 
the International Patent Classification. As moderators of this relationship, we test non-self forward 
citations (revealing a stream of knowledge between the firm and the outside) and non-self backward 
citations (assessing the firm’s  absorptive capacity). Findings highlight how the relationship 
between patent portfolio diversity and profitability is non-linear and differentially moderated by 
both the level of non-self forward and backward citations. Accordingly, implications for theory 
development and managerial decision making are discussed. 
Keywords: patent portfolio; diversity; performance; forward citations; backward citations 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, scholars and practitioners have witnessed significant growth in patent 
applications worldwide (OECD, 2015). Though patenting firms can establish a competitive 
advantage and reinforce their market position (Blind et al., 2009; Meyer and Subramanian, 2014), 
patenting remains an expensive practice for firms, whose pre-grant and post-grant costs (de 
Rassenfosse & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2013) may exceed its potential benefits: the former, 
entailing claim-based or page-base fees, and application fees like agents’ and translation ones 
(Harhoff et al., 2009); the latter, dealing with validation fees, yearly renewal fees, and all the costs 
to detect imitation and patent infringement (Parchomovsky & Wagner, 2005; Somaya, 2012). Other 
negative aspects (not only cost-related) emerge in cases in which the invention is easy to reverse 
engineer (Samuelson & Scotchmer, 2002) or the ease of inventing around makes it vulnerable in 
the face of the competition (Blind et al., 2009). In those cases, options such as secrecy and lead 
time prevail over patents to protect innovation (Cohen et al., 2000).  
On the one hand, holding patents canendow a competitive advantage, support managers in 
R&D and technological investment decisions (Lai et al., 2015), and reinforce the firm’s market 
position (Blind et al., 2009). However, on the other hand, the necessary investment to achieve and 
maintain patent protection are significant and the decision becomes one of an ex ante strategic 
decision based on the trade-off between benefits and costs of intellectual property rights (de 
Rassenfosse & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2013). Therefore, returns on patent investments 
may be low and, in most cases, difficult to estimate. Also, uncertainty in evaluating the value of 
patents ex ante is high, and it is linked to the technological and economic risks of the underlying 
invention. This line of reasoning indicates patents exhibit intrinsic value although some scholars 
argue the contrary where they have no value whatsoever (Parchomovsky & Wagner, 2005; 
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Shankerman, 1998). Although this asynchronous view on patent value and the existence of 
alternative ways of protecting technologies prevails, firms increasingly continue to increasingly 
make patent applications: United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) registered 589,410 
applications and granted 298,407 patents in 2015 only. This contradiction is known as the patent 
paradox and goes as follows: if patents on inventions have little or no expected economic value, 
why do individuals and commercial corporations patent so heavily? Or, if patents are valuable 
after all, where does their value lie? (Parchomovsky & Wagner, 2005, p. 5)   
Parchomovsky & Wagner (2005) address this issue by considering patent portfolios instead 
of independent unitary patents in isolation. The justification to consider the patent portfolios as the 
unit of analysis is twofold. First, and being grounded in traditional finance (portfolio) theory 
(Jacobs & Swink, 2011), risk reduction can be clearer by understanding compensative effects: a 
negative trend of a common stock could be “balanced out” by a positive trend of another negatively 
related common stock; so, the total portfolio risk is less than the simple sum of single risks. Second, 
by relying on the concepts of synergy, considering a collection of patents as an integrated whole 
allows the value of a portfolio to become greater than the sum of the value of its single elements, 
thanks to the creation of synergies between elements (Lin et al., 2006). This twofold logic offers a 
rationale for investing in patent portfolios with varying degrees of diversity. Particularly, patent 
portfolio diversity can be defined as the extent to which patents are spread across technological 
fields. We follow the International Patent Classification (IPC) which is a hierarchical classification 
system divided into sections, classes, and sub-classes. However, existing literature shows opposing 
views on whether portfolio diversity is beneficial for firm performance, and empirical research has 
been so far limited and anecdotal.  
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We aim to shed new light on the patent paradox by investigating the impact of patent 
portfolio diversity on the profitability of firms operating in patent-intensive manufacturing 
industries. We also explore how this relationship is attenuated when two important moderators are 
considered: non-self forward citations (FCs) (Hall et al., 2005; Yang et al., 2010; Grimaldi et l., 
2015) and non-self backward citations (BCs) (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002).  
Our paper is explicated as follows. We continue by introducing portfolio management 
strategy and discuss specialization-diversification dilemma. Thereafter, we propose a research 
framework with three hypotheses. Then we describe our research design, methods, and results. 
Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and managerial implications, limitations 
and avenues for future research.  
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Portfolio management decisions are critical strategic decisions, which depend on several factors 
such as the firm’s characteristics, industry, and competitors’ behaviors (Blind et al., 2009; 
Fernhaber and Patel, 2012; Hall et al., 2005; Somaya, 2012). A patent portfolio may: first, beused 
to make sense of the management of technological resources (Ernst, 2003); second, enable 
companies to assess their competitive positioning within specific technological fields (Lin et al., 
2006); third, unleash ‘offensive races’ in which few firms coordinate to gain competitive advantage 
(Jell et al., 2017); and, finally, help firms to study the evolution of technology within markets 
(Grimaldi et al., 2015). Overall, through the exploitation of bundles of technological resources, a 
better positioning facing increasing competition, and an increased capability to foresee 
technological change, patent portfolios can have a strong and robust effect on irms’ profitability 
(Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2010; Pohlmann et al., 2016). Accordingly, patenting can be conceived of 
as a profit maximizing strategy since it can lead to sales revenue maximization or cost reduction 
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(Van-Triest and Vis, 2007), regardless of whether firms carry out their business in developed or 
developing countries (Ambrammal and Sharma, 2016; Graphar et al., 2014). The way profitability 
is derived depends on the patent portfolio strategy the firm decides to follow. 
Two major alternative patent portfolio strategies have been identified to enable profitability 
gains. These are patent portfolio specialization and patent portfolio diversification. By following 
a patent portfolio specialization strategy, a firm decides to focus its efforts on core competencies 
which are shared by across all the portfolio’s constituent elements. Specialization allows firms to 
stand out due to their deep knowledge of their field, laying the foundations for a strong competitive 
advantage (Lin et al., 2006). It is also a way to benefit both from economies of experience 
associated with learning processes and the easier knowledge exchange between core technologies 
(Garcìa-Vega, 2006). This strategy is linked to incremental inventions grounded i  xisting 
knowledge and core competencies (Quintana-Garcìa & Benavides-Velasco, 2007). Parchomovsky 
& Wagner (2005) underline that a firm’s patent portfolio should be narrowly focused in a 
technological field, creating the premises for a ‘super patent’ that creates a superadditive right to 
exclude others from innovating in a broader technology set and gives the firm a stronger bargaining 
power position in a specific field. Breschi et al (2003) define specialized innovators firms that 
operate in only one technological field. The major risk for these firms is that of remaining locked 
in an obsolete field without the ability to change and renew their business (Quintana-Garcìa & 
Benavides-Velasco, 2007).  
In contrast, by pursuing a patent portfolio diversification strategy firms increase the scope 
of their activities by adding elements with characteristics that are not homogeneous. This means 
extending the knowledge system and principles underlying their products and their methods of 
production (Garcìa-Vega, 2006; Leten et al., 2007). A firm can decide to pursue a technological 
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diversification strategy because of several reasons including the: availability of slack resources; to 
exploit learning economies; to manage high uncertainty of research and development and broader 
innovation activities; and, the development of new, risky technologies or increasing the complexity 
of products and process (Leten et al., 2007; Garcìa-Vega, 2006). These drivers are industry-specific 
and path dependent, yet technological diversification can bring several benefits to firms.  
From a financial portfolio standpoint, diversification allows risk pooling (Garcìa-Vega 
2006). In general, this strategy allows firms to exploit new opportunities offered by the market 
(Garcìa-Vega, 2006; Lin et al., 2006) thereby broadening firms’ horizons in order to prevent market 
lock-in. Indeed, diversification allows firms to better explore and understand the commercial 
potential of the technology and so to c -evolve with the market (Chen et al., 2013; Garcìa-Vega, 
2006). Through technological diversification, unexpected cross-fertilizations of knowledge can 
emerge: the combination of different technologies could generate successful and revolutionary 
innovations (Chen et al., 2013). However, diversification is never costless. Diversification entails 
investments allowing firms to explore new technological fields (Quintana-Garcìa and Benavides-
Velasco 2007). An excessive technological diversification (over-diversification trap) causes a 
strong increase in coordination, communication, and technological knowledge integration costs 
(Chen et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2006). It may also nullify the benefits of a portfolio because unrelated 
patents can be placed in sparse technological fields that can cause a reduction in competitive power 
and protection (Parchomovsky & Wagner, 2005). 
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Patent portfolio diversity and firm profitability 
7 
 
Increasing patent portfolio diversity can have positive effects on firm profitability for a number of 
reasons. First, it allows risk pooling whereby the total risk of a portfolio is less than the risks of 
single patent investment. This enables firms to incur more investments in order to exploit more 
opportunities, and at the same time, it allows taking fewer risks. Second, a diversified portfolio 
enhances a firm’s capability to recognize new, successful opportunities. Indeed, the combination 
of different technologies contributes to creating new inventions (Chen et al., 2013; Garcìa-Vega, 
2006; Leten et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2006; Quintana-Garcìa & Benavides-Velasco, 2007). For 
instance, combining multidisciplinary knowledge from electronics, mechanics, and informatics led 
to the development of mechatronics, a distinct and burgeoning engineering sector (Leten et al., 
2007).  
Diversity has a positive effect on innovative ability, with a higher influence on exploratory 
innovative competence—that is the firm’s ability to create new technologies by linking different 
knowledge (Quintana-Garcìa & Benavides-Velasco, 2007). Therefore, diversity provides firms to 
better fulfill markets expectations and to potentially generate breakthrough innovations (Kaplan & 
Vakili, 2014). Notwithstanding its value, diversity does not come without its own challenges which 
include significant outlays in order to sustain knowledge development and coordination and 
communications costs (Chen et al., 2013; Parchomovsky & Wagner, 2005). High degrees of patent 
portfolio diversity can weaken a firm’s market position where patents spread across too many 
technology fields do not guarantee the good protection of inventions or success (Parchomovsky & 
Wagner, 2005). However, some scholars have demonstrated that increasing diversity may have 
some further potential downsides that include trade-offs between diversity and transaction costs, 
rather than having difficulties in coordinating and frequently re-adapting organizational routines 
(Stirling, 2007). A moderate level of technological diversity seems to be the ideal solution 
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(Sampson, 2007). Beyond a certain threshold, more diversity can be then detrimental to gain the 
returns of innovation. These arguments suggest that patent portfolio diversity is positively related 
to firm profitability but only up to a point. Beyond an ‘ideal’ level of diversity and inflection point 
maybe be reached after which costs become greater than the benefits of diversity which leads to a 
profitability decrease. This reasoning leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between patent portfolio diversity and firm profitability is 
curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) with the highest profitability occurring at an intermediate level of 
diversity. 
3.2 The moderating role of non-self forward citations 
Citations received by a patent reflect the intellectual lineage of the patent and the impact that the 
patent has on subsequent technological developments (Ketchen et al., 2013). Thus, the foeard 
citations (FCs) that a firm’s patents receive from subsequent patents have been acknowledged as a 
valid measure of technological importance (Hall et al., 2005; Ketchen et al., 2013; Trajtenberg, 
1990). Furthermore, FCs are useful to evaluate the quality of a patent portfolio and they have a 
positive impact on market value (Chen & Chang, 2009; Lin et al., 2006). In addition, there is a 
positive relationship between FCs and payment of renewal fees. These maintenance fees, due ev ry
four years, are typically high and allow the patent owner to retain the patent’s protection. For this 
reason, renewal fees are paid only if the patent is valuable to the firm. The more the patent is cited, 
the higher are the probability of renewal. Consequently,  the more the patent is cited, the higher the 
importance to the firm (Hedge & Sampat, 2009). FCs are generated after several years and when 
innovation uncertainty is notably decreased. Each new citation has a great positive effect on market 
value (Hall et al., 2005; Bessen, 2009). However, to avoid potential measurement noise, we 
considered the distinction between self and non-self FCs (Grimaldi et al., 2014; Hall et al., 2001). 
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Non-self FCs reveal a stream of knowledge between the firm and the marketplace. They constitute 
a “paper trail”, highlighting connections among patents owned by different firms. Non-self FCs are 
important to understand the technology position of apatent portfolio in the market. The higher the 
number of non-self FCs, the more a firm’s technology is ‘picked-up’ by competitors and other 
firms in the invention landscape. Potentially, this may result in profitability decay. The reason why 
this can arise is because of the lowering of technological asymmetries— h  more one firm exposes 
its technology, the higher the probability tha  others are able to observe this technology and 
associated practices and thereby lower the chances to profit from that invention for a longer period 
of time. Confronted with the paradox of disclosing novelty through patenting, firms may not be 
able to sustain their profitability levels over long periods of time. It is not by chance that the number 
of citations is higher for breakthrough innovations of general purpose technologies (Youtie et al., 
2008), which with their novelty heavily influence the field (Kaplan & Vakili, 2014). Non-self FCs 
are also an indicator of knowledge spillover, which is the uncompensated benefit that a firm’s 
activity provides to another external firm; under this respect, non-self FCs work to the competitors’ 
advantage. Knowledge spillovers are largely beyond the control of originating firms. Although 
non-self FCs potentially allow firms to better exploit their patent portfolio diversity, they do not 
always allow them to reach successively greater levels profitability. Overall, under circumstances 
of high spillovers, the better option for firms would be to reach moderate levels of patent portfolio 
diversity (i.e. diversity values higher than the mean value). This leads us to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Non-self forward citations positively moderate the inverted U-shape relationship 
between patent portfolio diversity and firm profitability, such that increasing numbers of non-self 
forward citations reduce the negative concavity of the curve.  
3.3 The moderating role of non-self backward citations 
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Backward citations (BCs) reveal the retrospective foundation on which an invention is realized. 
They signal the importance of external knowledge to the firm’s ability to develop new technologies. 
That is, the higher the number of citations made, the more the firm appropriates advantage from 
technologies owned by others. References to knowledge in previous patents provide information 
on the nature and originality of the research contributing to a patent (Jaffe et al., 2002; Trajtenberg 
et al., 1997). BCs are also positively related to the value of a patent (Harhoff et al., 2003; 
Gambardella et al., 2005; Arts et al., 2013). Indeed, Schoenmakers & Duysters (2010) demonstrate 
how BCs can contribute to the radicalness of technological inventions. More creative inventions 
have been identified as displaying novel pairwise combinations of technology subclasses or 
components at the patent level (Fleming et al., 2007). In order to avoid measurement noise and 
ambiguity deriving from operationalizing BCs as a mere overall count (Thompson, 2016), we 
disentangle the number of non-self BCs as they reasonably account for the fi m’s absorptive 
capacity, classically defined as “the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external 
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
Absorptive capacity is composed of four distinct capabilities: acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, and exploitation (Zahra & George, 2002). By considering these capabilities, 
absorptive capacity can be differentiated into two subsets: potential absorptive capacity and 
realized absorptive capacity. The former refers to the firm’s ability of acquisition and assimilation 
and is the ability to recognize external knowledge, interpret and understand it. Instead, realized 
absorptive capacity is related to transformation and exploitation and is the firm’s ability to use 
external knowledge in order to incorporate it into its technology or develop new ideas. Therefore, 
non-self BCs point to a firm’s potential and realized absorptive capacity, which enhances 
innovative capacity and firm’s value. This helps companies’ units to develop the ability to generate 
breakthrough inventions (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). According to Jansen et al. (2005, p. 999) “firms 
11 
 
focusing on transformation and exploitation (realized absorptive capacity) may achieve short-term 
profits through exploitation but fall into a competence trap and may not be able to respond to 
environmental changes.”  
Notwithstanding the value of relying on external knowledge sources, some scholars 
highlight that too much reliance on what others have created may push firms to indulge in local 
search behaviors (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Such states may force firms to recombine ‘old’ 
knowledge while overlooking breakthrough inventions. Also, the more firms rely on external 
knowledge, the lower their potential to jump from one technological trajectory an ther. Finally, 
overcoming a certain threshold of non-self BCs, firms may encounter the ‘over-search problem’ 
(Martini et al., 2017), whereby the routines of internal integration mechanisms and idea 
management systems may, in turn, generate high rates of false-positives. Given that this is the case 
for a limited set of patents, it is even more vital when considering strategic choices pertaining to 
entire patent portfolios. Consequently, we may speculate that the number of non-self BCs 
moderates the relationship between diversity and the firm’s profitability. In particular, high non-
self BCs show that firms are able to recognize and exploit new opportunities and different 
technologies, but overcoming a certain threshold implies experiencing the over-search problem. 
This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Non-self BCs negatively moderate the inverted U-shape relationship between 
diversity and profitability, such that increasing numbers of non-self BCs accentuate the negative 
concavity of the curve. 
Figure 1 represents our conceptual model and hypotheses. 
[Figure 1 here] 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
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4.1 Data Collection and Method 
This study analyzes international firms from three of the most patent-intensive subsectors1 of 
manufacturing. These were identified in the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS): machinery manufacturing (NAICS333); computer and electronic product manufacturing 
(NAICS334); electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing (NAICS335). We 
collected lagged financial performance data across the temporal horizon of 2010-2014. The source 
of these data was Osiris with patent portfolio data being drawn from the patent database PatBase. 
We restricted our analysis only to firms satisfying the following two criteria: 1) ≥250 employees2 
(average number over the last two years); and, 2) data regarding R&D expenditures in the last five 
years being available. In addition, we considered only portfolios including: patents granted by 
USPTO; patents with the earliest publication date between 2000 and 2010; patent portfolio size > 
8 (i.e. we exclude firms which have a number of patents smaller than the number of IPC 
technological sections). Overall, our dataset includes 391 international firms with patents granted 
in the US, firms meeting our criteria are classified in the industry NAICS334 (for the 77.75%), 
NAICS333 (for 16.41%) and in NAICS335 (5.84%). To test each hypothesis, the software package 
SPSS (v.24) was used. We mean-centered both independent and moderating variables and used the 
hierarchical regression method for the performance variable. In order to ensure the correct 
interpretation of the results, we excluded outliers for the dependent variables from the sample (± 3 
Std. Dev.).  
4.2 Independent and Moderating Variables 
                                                          
1 Patents by NAICS: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/naics/naics_toc.htm Using patents by NAICS 
is an approximation allowing us to associate patents with sectors. A limitation may be that not all the products of the 
391 selected companies fall under the most patent-intensive categories.  
2 Small firms are not considered in the calculation for entropy-based indicators because a critical mass of patents is 
needed.  
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This study measures patent portfolio diversity with an entropy-based measure (Palepu,1985) 
dealing with the three levels of the IPC classification: sections, classes, sub-classes. The motivation 
to use entropy-based indicators traces back to the 1960s. At that time, in the wake of information 
theorists’ studies (Pielou, 1975), measuring diversity could be carried out by measuring the 
information content of a long string of symbols (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). The notion 
underlying this analogy views an ecological sample of species as a ‘message’ with individual 
organisms as pieces of ‘information’ (Maurer and McGill, 2011). Since then, entropy-based 
indicators have been widely used in a number of different areas such as ecology, geography, urb n 
planning, psychology, linguistics, sociology, economics, and communication (McDonald and 
Dimmick, 2003). Innovation research is no exception and entropy-based indicators have been used 
to assess various phenomena including the potential of technological innovations (Zhang et al., 
2017), technological emergence (Avila-Robinson and Miyazaki, 2013), domain interdisciplinarity 
(Porter and Rafols, 2009), and knowledge recombination (Appio et al., 2017). According to Junge 
(1994), these indicators  are useful in assessing dual-concept diversity: “in statistical terms, a 
measure (index) of diversity is a summary description of a population with a class structure. More 
generally, quantification of diversity is related to the apportionment of some quantity (e.g., number 
of elements, time, mass) into a number of well-d fined classes … the complete or dual-concept 
type of diversity index reflects both the number of classes and the degree of evenness of the 
apportionment” (Junge, 1994, p. 16). 
 In our study, the ecological species refer to IPC sections, classes, and subclasses; whilst, 
the number of individual organisms would indicate their relative abundance. A general measure of 
information content for an infinitely large set of symbols is called Renyi entropy of order α. The 
value of interest for this study is the limit of the equation (Hill, 1973; Pielou, 1975) when α 
approaches 1, which yields: 
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� = − ∑ ���= ln �  
 
where pi is the proportion of elements belonging to the ith group. This is the Shannon-Wiener 
measure of species diversity: he more the elements are equally distributed among the groups, the 
higher the value of the H index. Based on the IPC classification3, we calculated three H indices: H1
refers to 8 sections; H2 refers to 127 classes; H3 refers to 367 sub-classe . All diversity indices have 
been jack-knifed (bias-reduction method). The jack-knife is a general statistical technique for 
reducing the bias of an estimator by removing subsets of the data and recalculating the estimator 
with the reduced sample (Magurran and McGill, 2011). 
To test our second and third hypotheses, as our level of analysis is the firm, we aggregate 
the total number of non-self FCs and non-self BCs for the entire portfolio and normalize them by 
portfolio size: � = �   −  ��    �  ℎ  � , = �   −  �    �  ℎ  �  
 
4.3 Control Variables 
We constructed two dummy variables to control for systematic industry effects, using NAICS334 
(computer and electronic product manufacturing) as the baseline. We also considered the patent 
breadth as the total number of technological groups where patents were filed (Fernhaber and Patel, 
2012). This index was calculated as the number of sections, classes and sub-classes the firms hold 
patents in. Other control variables are multiplicity (measured as the natural logarithm of the 
portfolio size), firm’s size (measured as the natural logarithm of the average operating revenues, 
                                                          
3 http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/  
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or the average sale associated o the firm’s core operations considering the years from 2010 to 
2014), and R&D expenditures (measured as the ratio between R&D expenditures and operating 
revenues in the years from 2010 to 2014). 
4.4 Dependent Variables 
Consistent with other studies (Barnett et al., 1994; Zajac et al., 2000; Sørensen, 2002; Bae and 
Gargiulo, 2004. Lin et al., 2006), we chose Return on Assets (ROA) as the profitability index. 
While discussion concerning the most appropriate indicators of firm profitability is widespread 
(e.g., Scherer and Ross, 1990; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986), ROA remains a widely 
adopted measure in innovation studies (Artz et al., 2010; Roberts and Amit, 2003; Sher and Yang, 
2005) as it evaluates the ability of a firm to generate earnings from its asset or investment base.  
As robustness check, we also considered Profit Margin (profit as a percentage of revenues), Return 
on Equity (ROE), and Cash Flows. Table 1 provides a summary of the used variables. 
[Table 1 here] 
5.  RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients among the key variables, along with their means and 
standard deviations.  
[Table 2 here] 
It is worth noting that ROA shows a positive and significant (p ≤ 0.01) correlation with 
both the diversity and breadth levels, signaling (especially at Section level) that potentially the 
higher the number of technological sections considered in the patent portfolio, the higher the ROA. 
On the contrary, a negative and significant (p  ≤ 0.05) correlation emerges between ROA and the 
adjusted measure of non-self FCs. We may preliminarily conclude that the higher the technological 
acceptance from external organizations, the lower the chances to gain higher levels of ROA. This 
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may be consistent with the existence of a threshold beyond which negative returns show up. A 
similar conclusion may hold for the adjusted measure of non-self BCs, but in this case, the 
correlation is not significant. Results concerning the testing of the three hypotheses follow. 
5.1 Testing Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 suggests an inverted-U shape relationship between patent portfolio diversity and firm 
profitability. Formally4: 
� � � = � + � �′ + � �′ + ∑ �� ��=     (1) 
where k (from 1 to 3) identifies the considered level of the IPC classification. We then tested our 
hypotheses (Table 3). 
[Table 3 here] 
When considering the patent portfolio diversity at the Section level (Figure 2), results 
support our hypothesis (β1= -7.44, p  ≤ 0.01). Considering the patent portfolio diversity both at the 
classes and sub-classe  levels, hypothesis 1 is not supported.  
[Figure 2 here] 
5.2 Testing Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2  asserts that the number of non-self FCs moderates the inverted-U shape relationship 
between diversity and profitability (Table 4). Formally5: 
 � � � = � + � �  + � �′ + �  � + � �′ + � � + � � + ∑ ���= �
          (2) 
 
                                                          
4 Control variables: Dummy NAICS333, Dummy NAICS335, Multiplicity, Firm’s size, R&D expenditures, Breadth 
sections, Breadth classes, Breadth sub-classes. 
5 Control variables considered: Dummy NAICS333, Dummy NAICS335, Multiplicity, F rm’s size, R&D 
expenditures, Breadth sections, Breadth classes, Breadth sub-classes. 
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where k (from 1 to 3) identifies the considered level of the IPC classification. We hypothesized that 
high numbers of FCs reduce the negative concavity of the relationship between patent portfolio 
diversity and profitability. We employed three models for each profitability variable: a model that 
considers only control variables and direct effects, a model with the addition of the linear 
moderating effects, and another with the addition of the non-linear moderating effects. 
[Table 4 here] 
Considering H1, results do not support this hypothesis (β1=-1.78; p ≤ 0.01). However, results 
highlight a significant positive coefficient for the linear interaction of patent portfolio diversity and 
FCs. This holds for the second model (which excludes non-linear moderating effects) as well. 
Finally, considering the sub-class level (H3), results do not confirm expectations (β1=-0.26; p<0.1). 
Just as for H2, the second model shows a significant positive effect of the linear interaction of patent 
portfolio diversity and FCs for ROA. Figure 3 reveals the relationship between H1 a d profitability 
for high, average, and low number of FCs. For low levels of FCs, the coefficient of H2 becomes 
positive and modifies the concavity of the curve. For high levels of FCs, the relationship between 
profitability and patent portfolio diversity has a more accentuated negative concavity. As shown in 
Figure 3, in correspondence of low degrees of diversity firms reach greater profitability for low 
numbers for FCs, even though the curve has a negative slope. Beyond the crossing point of the 
curves, high numbers of FCs correspond to higher levels of profitability.  
[Figure 3 here] 
5.3 Testing Hypothesis 3 
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Hypothesis 3 advances that the number of non-self backward citations moderates the inverted-U 
shape relationship between diversity and profitability (Table 5). Formally6: 
� � � = � + � + � �′ + � + � �′ + � + � + ∑ �� ��=  
            (3) 
 
where k (from 1 to 3) identifies the considered level of the IPC classification. We hypothesized that 
high numbers of non-self BCs accentuate the negative concavity of the relationship between patent 
portfolio diversity and profitability. 
[Table 5 here] 
Considering diversity at the level of sections, results support the expectation (β1=-0.82; p ≤ 
0.05). In addition, we found significant positive effects of the linear interaction of patent portfolio 
diversity and BCs for the profitability measure. Considering diversity at the class level, w  found 
support for our hypothesis (β1= -0.35; p ≤ 0.05). Again, we found significant positive effects of the 
linear interaction of patent portfolio diversity and BCs for the profitability measure. Finally, 
considering diversity at sub-classes level, results confirm the hypothesis (β1= -0.28; p ≤ 0.01) and 
a significant positive effect of the linear interaction of patent portfolio diversity and BCs for the 
profitability measure.  
Figure 4 shows the relationship between patent portfolio diversity considering sections (H1) 
and profitability, for high, average, and low number of BCs. For high levels of BCs, such 
relationship has a more accentuated concavity and maximum point of the curve is higher. 
Moreover, because of the positive linear interaction between patent portfolio diversity and 
profitability, the maximum is reached in correspondence of higher degrees of patent portfolio 
diversity, thus firms can benefit from growing profitability in correspondence to larger ranges of 
                                                          
6 Control variables considered: Dummy NAICS333, Dummy NAICS335, Multiplicity, Firm’s size, R&D 
expenditures, Breadth sections, Breadth classes, Breadth sub-classes. 
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patent portfolio diversity. For low levels of BCs, the coefficient of H12 becomes closer to zero, thus 
the relationship between H1 and profitability becomes almost linear negative. 
[Figure 4 here] 
Overall, results support several but not all of our hypotheses. Results fundamentally vary 
depending on the level at which we considered patent portfolio diversity. Indeed, results are more 
significant considering patent portfolio diversity at the section level. By considering diversity both 
at class and sub-class levels, results are less significant and sometimes contradict the expected 
relationships. By performing a robustness check on other profitability measures (ROE, Profit 
Margin, Cash Flow)7, we observed that the results change depending on the measure considered. 
Table 6 offers a synopsis of our data analysis scheme and reports the hypotheses and associated 
key findings. 
[Table 6 here] 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS   
We contribute with a systematic analysis of the relationship between patent portfolio diversity and 
firm profitability. Our findings highlight how the non-linear relationship between patent portfolio 
diversity and profitability varies depending on the level of non-self FCs and BCs. In doing so, we
relied on a sample of 391 international firms and considered patent portfolio diversity at the level 
of sections, classes, and sub-classes (following the structure of the IPC classification). Each model 
was then tested in relation to ROA, and a robustness check has been performed on profit margin, 
ROE and cash flow as well. We revealed that findings vary according to the level of the 
technological classification considered. This is supposedly due to the hierarchical structure of the 
                                                          
7 Correlation between ROA and: Profit Margin (0.909, p<0.01), ROE (0.801, p<0.01), Cash Flow (0.471, p<0.01). 
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IPC classification. As a consequence, the measure of diversity at one level does not take into 
account diversification at underlying levels. Also, our findings support the existence of an inverted-
U relationship between patent portfolio diversity at the section level and ROA. Therefore, results 
strengthen the idea that profitability increases until a certain level of patent portfolio diversity, 
reaches a maximum and then decreases.  
Considering the nature of data, we observe that profitability reaches the maximum impact 
on profitability for low levels of diversity and then decreases. This suggests that very low or very 
high patent portfolio diversity are likely to result in lower profitability than average levels of 
diversity. We tested the relationship between patent portfolio diversity and profitability by 
accounting for the influence of two specific moderators: non-self FCs, which are a proxy of the 
quality of firm’s technology and its spillover in the market; non-self BCs, which are a proxy of 
absorptive capacity. Results indicate that, contrary to our expectations, FCs accentuate the negative 
concavity of patent portfolio diversity–profitability relationship. Although they potentially allow 
firms to better exploit patent portfolio diversity, they not always allow them to reach greater 
profitability. This suggests that in presence of high spillovers, the better option for firms is to reach 
moderate levels of patent portfolio diversity (i.e. diversity values higher than the mean value). On 
the contrary, for portfolios with patents that are not especially significant for the market or not of 
high quality, high profitability is generated from low levels of diversity. 
 Concerning the second moderator, results show that high numbers of non-self BCs 
accentuate the concavity of the relationship between patent portfolio diversity and profitability. 
This finding is stable considering diversity at all levels and supports the thesis that high absorptive 
capacity allows firms to better recognize external opportunities, also coming from different 
technological firms. Absorptive capacity, therefore, enhances firm ’ ability to manage technologies 
21 
 
across different fields and, in correspondence of high levels of diversity, allows to reach higher 
profitability. Indeed, for low levels of non-self BCs, profitability decreases as patent portfolio 
diversity increases. This supports the thesis that for low absorptive capacity firms do not have the 
ability to successfully use knowledge from different technological fields. In such situations, a better 
strategy may be that of focusing on a limited number of technological fields.  
By performing a robustness check, results seem to vary depending on the profitability 
measure considered, sometimes showing unexpected results. Specifically, considering the diversity 
at the level of sub-classes and ROE, results refuted the hypothesis of an inverted U-shape 
relationship between patent portfolio diversity and profitability. Thus, in this case, we found a U-
shaped relationship, signaling that it may be better to avoid intermediate values of diversity. 
Finally, no significant variation is shown when it comes to multiplicity (no significant effects) and 
firm size (always positive and significant effects). The latter shows that the larger the firms (in 
terms of average operating revenues), the larger the effect on the ROA and this holds regardless 
the presence of both non-self BCs and FCs as moderators. Also, larger firms tend to have higher 
performance, regardless of the level of technological diversity we consider.  
There are several implications of our research. The results clearly show differences in the 
behavior of the profitability curve whenever patent portfolio diversity is considered at the level of 
section, classes or sub-classes. This is potentially due to the structure of the IPC classification. 
Indeed, this classification follows a hierarchical method: the 8 sections are in turn divided into one 
127 classes, which in turn are divided into 367 subclasses. This may explain why results differ 
across the considered levels of diversity. If we suppose, for instance, all patents of a specific firm 
are classified in one technological section only, we may have a minimum level of diversity at this 
level. However, the section is divided into several technological classes, and patents could spread 
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across these levels. Therefore, the measure of diversity at one level does not seem to take into 
account the measure of diversity at more underlying levels. At the level of sections, our findings 
support the presence of a non-linear diversity-profitability relationship that is subject to the 
influence of the moderators. This means that keeping constant the degree of patent portfolio 
diversity, different firms do not reach the same profitability, calling then for considering different 
strategies. It is particularly important to take into account the absorptive capacity of firms and its 
ability to learn vicariously for the external environment. With these greater abilities, the higher is 
the firm’s chance to perform successful diversification. Practically, this means that firms that intend 
to diversify their range of technologies need to accurately select their patent portfolio’s 
composition and nurture their capacity to take advantage from diversification. The talent to steer 
the activity to promising technological fields depends on the capability to absorb external 
knowledge and maintain a competitive advantage in the market. Both external non-self FCs and 
BCs are measures of these abilities, and both partly depend on external sourcing technology, which 
requires various levels of flexibility and commitment. In short, the firm’s willingness to pursue a 
technology diversification strategy should be sustained by alliances or external collaborations that 
allow for knowledge sharing.  
7. LIMITATIONS  AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our work is subject to a number of limitations that should be taken into account while interpreting 
the results. Our sampling frame is limited to patents filed with the USPTO between 2000 and 2010, 
and to three focal sectors (i.e. NAICS 333,334,335). Due the characteristics of the sectors included 
in our study, our findings may apply to industries where patenting cycles are relatively short and 
dynamic, and R&D and patenting activities are not heavily regulated. In contrast, our results may 
not generalize to industries with longer R&D and patenting cycles, and/or where these activities 
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are highly regulated. Key examples of the latter are healthcare and pharma sectors, where the nature 
of the relationship between patent portfolio diversity and profitability may be subject to different 
rules. Future research may look into replicating and extending our findings in light of key 
differences across these salient dimensions. Some further avenues for future research emerge from 
this study. We demonstrated the lack of universal generalizations and importance of considering 
complexity as a result of the interaction of different aspects of patent portfolios. Established 
empirical precedent developed the topic of complexity in various ways but most particularly by the 
analysis of product portfolios or alliances portfolios. However, certain conflation emerges 
concerning the definition of the complexity of patent portfolios especially when it comes to 
consider its measures and components. Future research, by entailing results concerning the 
interaction among different components, might provide a more rigorous characterization of the 
patent portfolio complexity.  
A second fascinating question arises from the observation of differences in results on 
various profitability measures. We considered firms’ profitability as our performance measures 
and, therefore, it can be interesting to take directly into account how patents contribute to the 
creation of profit. In detail, firms can exploit patented technology into two ways: by focusing the 
technology on their own products or by licensing activity. Previous literature (e.g., Blind et al., 
2009; Somaya, 2012) focused on the relationship between portfolio characteristics and strategic 
drivers. Future research can move from this insight and focus on how patent strategy affects the 
relationship between patent portfolio complexity and firms’ profitability.  
Third, results highlight notable differences among diversity considered at the level of 
sections, classes, and sub-classes. We demonstrate that the relationship between patent portfolio 
diversity at the level of sections and profitability is influenced by the spread of patent at the 
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underlying levels. Future research might investigate more closely if the ideal degree of diversity 
depends on the distribution of patents across technological classes or sub-classes. A study of this 
nature might actively contribute to defining a better strategy of patent portfolio management.  
Fourth, the relationship between portfolio characteristics and firm profitability is complex 
and requires further investigation. Indeed, depending on the choice of measurement of portfolio’s 
characteristics and the firm’s profitability, the relationship may vary. For instance, it is possible to 
consider economic-financial performance in terms of profits, sales, market value, and similar 
measures, or innovative performance in terms of firm’s capacity to create something different. The 
relationship between portfolio characteristics and firm’s profitability may depend on several 
factors. Considering industry exigencies, sectors with different characteristics (e.g., healthcare, 
construction, ICT, and telecommunications) may require diverse approaches each generating 
different results (Chen and Chang, 2010). Also a differentiation between patent-intensive and 
nonpatent-intensive industries can be worthy of further investigation in order to understand 
whether—and to what extent—non-self BCs and FCs shape the link between patent portfolio 
diversity and firm profitability. Industrial affiliation and competitors’ behaviors influence a firm’s 
strategy and goals, and these can be classified in different ways (Blind et al., 2009; Somaya, 2012). 
Following Somaya (2012), it may be possible to identify three main general strategies. The first is 
the proprietary strategy, in which a patent portfolio is built with the aim to build barriers and block 
the entrance of competitors in the firm’s market. The second is defensive strategy, which is 
followed with the purpose to guard against infringements of competitors’ patents. The third is the 
leverage strategy with which the firm seeks to exploit the patent’s bargain advantage. The same 
degree of patent portfolio complexity may correspond to different profitability implications 
depending on firm strategy (Blind et al., 2009). Finally, results could vary further subject to 
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differing degrees of a firm’s competitive position (Chen and Chang, 2010), internationalization 
(Cantwell and Piscitello, 2000), or experience (Heeley and Jacobson, 2008).  
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Figure 1. Conceptual model 
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Table 1. Variables and measures 
Variable type Variable name Measure 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Diversity at Section level 
(k=1)  
H′ = − ∑ pii= ln pi  
 
  
Diversity at Class level (k=2) H′ = − ∑ pii= ln pi  
 
  
Diversity at Sub-class level 
(k=3) 
H′ = − ∑ pii= ln pi  
 
Moderating 
Variables 
 
 
Adjusted Forward Citations  
 = Number of non − self FCsNumber of patents in the portfolio 
 
  
Adjusted Backward Citations = Number of non − self BCsNumber of patents in the portfolio 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
Dummy NAICS333 
 
1 if the firm belong to NAICS 333, 0 otherwise 
 Dummy NAICS335 1 if the firm belong to NAICS 335, 0 otherwise 
 Breadth at Section level Breadth_1, number of technological section where patents were 
filed 
 Breadth at Class level Breadth_2, number of technological classes where patents were 
filed 
 Breadth at Sub-class level Breadth_3, number of technological Sub-classes where patents were 
filed 
 Firm Size ln (∑  �= Operating Revenues/5) 
 R&D Expenditures (∑  �= R&D Expenditures/Operating Revenue)/5 
 Multiplicity ln (number of patents in the portfolio) 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
ROA 
 
Average Return on Assets of the last five years 
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Table 2. Pearson’s Correlation matrix 
  H1 H2 H3 Dummy 
NAICS333 
Dummy 
NAICS335 
Breadth 
Sections 
Breadth 
Classes 
Breadth 
Sub-
classes 
Profit 
Margin  
ROE ROA Cash 
Flow 
Adj. 
FCs 
Adj. 
BCs 
Multiplicity  Size R&D 
exp. 
H1 1                                 
H2 .774**  1                               
H3 .561**  .842**  1                             
Dummy 
NAICS333 
.317**  .339**  .249**  1                           
Dummy 
NAICS335 
.157**  .128* .120* -.111* 1                         
Breadth 
Sections 
.613**  .679**  .674**  .233**  0.090 1                       
Breadth 
Classes 
.459**  .642**  .702**  .224**  -0.010 .773**  1                     
Breadth 
Sub-classes 
.353**  .553**  .666**  .172**  -0.041 .693**  .975**  1                   
Profit 
Margin  
0.082 .123* .150**  .139**  -0.029 .183**  .191**  .210**  1                 
ROE .116* .115* .127* .175**  0.027 .115* .118* .117* .700**  1               
ROA .132**  .153**  .165**  .147**  -0.010 .187**  .160**  .168**  .909**  .801**  1             
Cash Flow -0.024 -0.009 0.028 -0.041 -0.015 .105* .186**  .205**  .604**  .303**  .471**  1           
Adj. FCs -.104* -.196**  -0.097 -.147**  0.020 -.129* -.170**  -.174**  -.122* -0.072 -.110* 0.003 1         
Adj. BCs 0.090 -0.053 0.019 0.040 .156**  -0.050 -.213**  -.258**  -0.084 -0.033 -0.072 -0.029 .730**  1       
Multiplicity  0.090 .346**  .480**  0.038 -.108* .640**  .825**  .837**  .195**  0.090 .146**  .265**  -.141**  -.312**  1     
Size .272**  .386**  .481**  .138**  0.036 .589**  .696**  .697**  .335**  .267**  .309**  .152**  -0.042 -0.095 .663**  1   
R&D exp. -.364**  -.271**  -.124* -.245**  -.137**  -.224**  -.136**  -0.086 -.316**  -.317**  -.365**  .123* .160**  0.057 0.090 -.301**  1 
Mean .9626 1.882 2.675 .1601 .0604 5.346 24.06 56.46 3.534 2.476 2.946 11.87 9.529 13.33 4.588 6.604 10.82 
Std. Dev. .3405 .5690 .6993 .3672 .2385 1.720 19.24 58.91 14.99 28.78 11.03 7.542 9.111 7.850 1.544 1.609 10.05 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 3. Testing Hypothesis 1
 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Linear Effects 
         
H’1 
 
-2.33 -2.11 
      
  
(1.76) (1.75) 
      
H’2 
    
-0.67 -1.21 
   
     
(1.04) (1.10) 
   
H’3 
       
-0.26 0.38         
(0.80) (0.89) 
Non-Linear  Effects 
         
H’12 
  
-7.44*** 
      
   
(2.82) 
      
H’22 
     
-1.54 
   
      
(1.05) 
   
H’32 
        
1.05          
(0.66) 
Controls 
         
Dummy NAICS333 2.66** 2.88** 3.46*** 2.80** 2.94** 3.17*** 2.44** 2.51** 2.33**  
(1.15) (1.16) (1.17) (1.16) (1.18) (1.19) (1.14) (1.16) (1.17) 
Dummy NAICS335 0.23 0.32 0.8 0.07 0.24 0.26 -0.18 -0.07 -0.16  
(1.79) (1.79) (1.79) (1.77) (1.79) (1.79) (1.77) (1.80) (1.80) 
Multiplicity 0.03 -0.23 -0.24 0.32 0.21 -0.1 -0.04 -0.06 0.2  
(0.45) (0.49) (0.49) (0.54) (0.57) (0.61) (0.54) (0.54) (0.56) 
Firm size 1.49*** 1.52*** 1.63*** 1.55*** 1.53*** 1.60*** 1.49*** 1.50*** 1.47***  
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
R&D expenditures -0.071 -0.077 -0.084 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Breadth sections -0.48* -0.08 -0.21 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02  
(0.34) (0.45) (0.45) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Intercept -3.87** -5.04** -4.31** -6.535*** -6.44*** -5.82*** -5.54** -5.63** -6.38***  
(2.66) (2.01) (2.02) (2.80) (2.18) (2.22) (2.44) (2.36) (2.40) 
F-stat 7.05*** 6.30*** 6.47*** 7.150*** 6.18*** 5.69*** 6.77*** 5.80*** 5.41*** 
R2 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.104 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 
ΔF-stat 7.05*** 1.76 6.96*** 7.150*** 0.42 2.14 6.77 0.10 2.54 
Adjusted-R2 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 
Sample size 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 
Highest VIF 3.14 3.83 3.87 4.57 6.34 7.57 4.12 5.14 6.65 
 
*p ≤ 0.1 **p ≤ 0.05 ***p ≤ 0.01 
All diversity indicators jack-knifed 
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Figure 2. H’1-Performance relationship at technology section level (mean-centered variables) 
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Table 4. Testing Hypothesis 2
  1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Direct effects          
H' 1 -1.84 -1.51 -1.98       
 (1.76) (1.75) (1.73)       
H' 12 -8.79*** -8.23*** -9.54***       
 (2.83) (2.80) (2.79)       
H' 2    -1.10 -1.13 -1.41    
 
   (1.11) (1.11) (1.12)    
H' 22    -1.72 -1.19 -1.42    
 
   (1.06) (1.08) (1.09)    
H' 3       2.16 2.06 1.89 
 
      (1.61) (1.61) (1.61) 
H' 32       2.26 2.27 1.9 
 
      (1.17) (1.16) (1.20) 
FCs -0.18** -0.12 0.09 -0.20** -0.13 -0.05 -0.54** -0.46 -0.35 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) 
FCs2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.002* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Linear mod.. effects          
H' 1x FCs  0.72*** 0.40*       
 
 (0.22) (0.24)       
H' 2x FCs     0.33** 0.2    
     (0.14) (0.16)    
H' 3x FCs     
  
 0.30** 0.17 
                (0.20) (0.23) 
Non-Linear mod. effects          
H' 12x FCs   -1.78***       
 
  
(0.54)       
H' 22x FCs      -0.28    
      (0.18)    
H' 32x FCs         -0.26* 
                  (0.20) 
Controls          
Dummy NAICS333 3.05** 3.58*** 3.30*** 2.82** 3.05** 3.04** 3.97 4.21* 4.27* 
 (1.20) (1.20) (1.18) (1.22) (1.21) (1.21) (2.09) (2.10) (2.10) 
Dummy NAICS335 0.91 1.02 1.17 0.40 0.03 0.27 3.18 2.66 3.23 
 (1.81) (1.78) (1.76) (1.81) (1.80) (1.81) (3.32) (3.34) (3.36) 
Multiplicity -0.58 -0.47 -0.45 -0.31 -0.34 -0.31 -1.44 -1.58 -1.46 
 (0.51) (0.50) (0.50) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (1.02) (1.02) (1.03) 
Firm size 1.96*** 2.05*** 1.96*** 1.98*** 2.06*** 2.08*** 4.54*** 4.58*** 4.57*** 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.73) (0.73) (0.73) 
R&D expenditures -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.09 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Breadth sections -0.2 -0.32 -0.30 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Intercept -4.89** -5.27** -4.67** -7.00*** -7.56*** -7.62*** -16.35*** -16.39*** -16.49*** 
  (2.05) (2.03) (2.01) (2.23) (2.23) (2.22) (4.29) (4.28) (4.28) 
F-stat 6.76*** 7.26*** 7.76*** 6.10*** 6.14*** 5.87*** 11.37*** 10.56*** 9.84*** 
R2 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.25 0.25 
Δ F-stat 6.76*** 10.51*** 11.09*** 6.10*** 5.79** 2.52 11.37*** 2.14** 1.66* 
Adjusted-R2 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.22 0.23 
Sample size 376 376 376 377 377 377 370 370 370 
Highest VIF 4.22 4.44 6.54 7.63 7.66 7.73 6.81 7.21 7.39 
*p ≤ 0.1 **p ≤ 0.05 ***p ≤ 0.01 
All diversity indicators jack-knifed 
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Figure 3. Moderating role of FCs in the relationship between H’1 and firm profitability (mean-centered variables) 
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Table 5. Testing Hypothesis 3
  1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Direct effects          
H' 1 -2.42 -2.42 -2.02       
 (1.75) (1.73) (1.74)       
H' 12 -7.80*** -9.15*** -8.08***       
 (2.82) (2.86) (2.88)       
H' 2    -1.12 -1.46 -1.21    
 
   (1.13) (1.13) (1.13)    
H' 22    -1.96* -2.12** -1.83*    
 
   (1.07) (1.06) (1.06)    
H' 3       0.66 0.28 0.6 
 
      (0.95) (0.95) (0.95) 
H' 32 
      0.71 0.28 -0.01 
 
      (0.67) (0.69) (0.68) 
BCs 0.07 0.05 0.16* 0.00 -0.01 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 0.11 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
BCs2 -0.003** -0.003* -0.004** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.004*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Linear moderation. effects          
H' 1x BCs 
 0.43** 0.45***       
 
 (0.17) (0.17)       
H' 2x BCs     0.28** 0.28***    
     (0.11) (0.11)    
H' 3x BCs     
  
 0.26** 0.22** 
                (0.10) (0.10) 
Non-Linear moderation. effects          
H' 12x BCs   -0.82**       
 
  
(0.37)       
H' 22x BCs      -0.35**    
      (0.14)    
H' 32x BCs      
 
  -0.28*** 
                  (0.09) 
Controls          
Dummy NAICS333 3.29*** 3.33*** 3.19*** 3.18** 2.85** 3.01** 2.34* 2.01* 2.37** 
 (1.17) (1.17) (1.16) (1.22) (1.22) (1.21) (1.20) (1.20) (1.19) 
Dummy NAICS335 0.60 0.37 0.54 0.32) -0.35 -0.35 -0.09 -0.85 -0.52 
 (1.80) (1.79) (1.78) (1.84) (1.85) (1.83) (1.85) (1.86) (1.85) 
Multiplicity -0.17 -0.15 -0.11 -0.15 -0.25 -0.17 0.14 -0.14 -0.05 
 (0.53) (0.33) (0.53) (0.64) (0.63) (0.63) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) 
Firm size 1.66*** 1.74*** 1.70*** 1.82*** 1.87*** 1.85*** 1.71*** 1.74*** 1.72*** 
 (0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.41) 
R&D expenditures -0.09 -0.09* -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.46) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) 
Breadth sections -0.19 -0.26 -0.24 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Intercept -4.72** -4.93** -4.94** -6.79*** -7.03*** -7.03*** -7.26*** -6.91*** -6.83*** 
  (2.02) (2.01) (2.00) (2.25) (2.22) (2.22) (2.45) (2.43) (2.41) 
F-stat 5.66*** 5.78*** 5.76*** 5.52*** 5.71*** 5.78*** 5.02*** 5.23*** 5.69*** 
R2 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.16 
ΔF-stat 5.66*** 6.17** 4.94** 5.52*** 6.73** 5.757** 5.02*** 6.53** 9.46** 
Adjusted-R2 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.1 0.11 0.13 
Sample size 376 376 376 377 377 377 377 377 377 
Highest VIF 4.49 4.49 4.49 7.66 7.78 7.84 6.96 8.01 8.11 
*p ≤ 0.1 **p ≤ 0.05 ***p ≤ 0.01 
All diversity indicators jack-knifed         
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Figure 4. Moderating role of BCs in the relationship between H’H1 and Profitability (mean-centered variables) 
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Table 6. Summary of results (considering other performance measures for robustness check) 
Hypothesis 1      
 The relationship between diversity and profitability is curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) with the highest 
profitability occurring at an intermediate level of diversity. 
 
   Robustness check   
 ROA Profit Margin ROE Cash Flow  
H’H1    n.s  
H’H2 n.s n.s n.s   
H’H3 n.s n.s  n.s  
Hypothesis 2      
 The number of non-self FCs moderates the inverted U-shape relationship between diversity and 
profitability: increasing the number of non-self FCs decreases the negative concavity of the curve. 
 ROA Profit Margin ROE Cash Flow  
H’H1    n.s  
H2 n.s  n.s n.s  
H3   n.s n.s  
Hypothesis 3      
 The number of non-self BCs moderates the inverted U-shape relationship between diversity and 
profitability: increasing number of non-self BCs accentuates the negative concavity of the curve. 
 ROA Profit Margin ROE Cash Flow  
H’H1    n.s  
H’H2    n.s  
H’H3   
 
 n.s  
 : results support the hypothesis;    results are opposite to the hypothesis; n.s: non-significant results 
  
